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Abstract
Despite their well-known security problems, passwords
are still the incumbent authentication method for virtually
all online services. To remedy the situation, users are
very often referred to password managers as a solution to
the password reuse and weakness problems. However, to
date the actual impact of password managers on password
strength and reuse has not been studied systematically.
We provide the first large-scale study of the pass-
word managers’ influence on users’ real-life passwords.
By combining qualitative data on users’ password cre-
ation and management strategies, collected from 476
participants of an online survey, with quantitative data
(incl. password metrics and entry methods) collected in
situ with a browser plugin from 170 users, we were able
to gain a more complete picture of the factors that influ-
ence our participants’ password strength and reuse. Our
approach allows us to quantify for the first time that pass-
word managers indeed influence the password security,
however, whether this influence is beneficial or aggravat-
ing existing problems depends on the users’ strategies
and how well the manager supports the users’ password
management right from the time of password creation.
Given our results, we think research should further inves-
tigate how managers can better support users’ password
strategies in order to improve password security as well
as stop aggravating the existing problems.
1 Introduction
For several decades passwords prevail as the default au-
thentication scheme for virtually all online services [44,
11, 30]. At the same time, research has again and again
demonstrated that passwords perform extremely poor in
terms of security [48]. For instance, various attacks ex-
ploit that humans fail to create strong passwords them-
selves [10, 19, 45, 31, 34]. Even worse, there is an ob-
servable trend towards an increasing number of online ser-
vices that users register to. This increasing number of re-
quired passwords in combination with the limited human
capacity to remember passwords leads to the bad practice
of re-using passwords across accounts [26, 51, 16, 66].
In the past, different solutions have been implemented
to help users creating stronger passwords, such as pass-
word meters and policies, which are also still subject of
active research [41, 54, 17, 45, 68]. Among the most of-
ten recommended solutions [28, 59, 53, 62, 56] to these
problems for end-users is technical support in the form of
password management software. Those password man-
agers come built-in to our browsers, as a browser plugin,
or as separate applications. Password managers are being
recommended as a solution because they fulfill impor-
tant usability and security aspects at the same time: They
store all the users’ passwords so the users do not have to
memorize them; they can also help users entering their
passwords by automatically filling them into log-in forms;
and they can also offer help in creating unique, random
passwords. By today, there are several examples of third
party password managers that fit this description, such
as Lastpass [5], 1Password [1], and even seemingly unre-
lated security software, such as anti-virus [4] solutions.
Unfortunately, it has not been sufficiently studied in
the past whether password managers fulfill their promise
and indeed have a positive influence on password security
or not? To break this question down, we are interested
in 1) whether password managers actually store strong
passwords that are likely auto-generated by, for instance,
password generators, or if they really are just storage
where users save their self-made, likely weak passwords?
Further, we are interested whether 2) users, despite using
password managers, still reuse passwords across different
websites or if do they use the managers’ support to main-
tain a large set of unique passwords for every distinct
service? Prior works [66, 51] that studied password reuse
and strength in situ have also considered password man-
agers as factors, but did not find an influence by managers
and could not conclusively answer those questions.
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Figure 1: Users’ strategies for password creation and storage plus the stages of our study to investigate managers’ influence.
Our contributions: We argue that to specifically study
the impact of password managers, important aspects were
missing in prior work, and this paper’s most tangible con-
tribution is an extension of prior methodologies to be able
to study password managers’ impact in the wild. First,
previous works considered only the presence of password
management software on the user device and whether
a password was auto-filled or not. However, to better
distinguish the storage option of a password (i.e., mem-
orized and manually entered, auto-filled by the browser,
copy&pasted, or filled by a browser plugin) a more fine-
grained entry method detection is required. Second, users
do not axiomatically follow strict workflows for password
creation, storage, and entry [27, 29, 62, 56, 58] (see Fig-
ure 1). For instance, the effort users are willing to invest in
creating a unique and strong password often depends on
the privacy-sensitivity of the associated account. For creat-
ing a new password, the approaches range from mental al-
gorithms (e.g., leetifying a known word) over pen&paper
algorithms and password generator tools (e.g., websites
like https://www.random.org/passwords/) to 3rd
party password managers (e.g., LastPass, KeePass, etc.).
Based on different factors, such as technical skills, trust in
software vendors, financial expenditure, multi-device sup-
port, or others, users resort to different password storage
options from where the password finds its way via vari-
ous entry methods into the login forms. To better study
password managers’ influence, one has to take the users’
creation and storage strategies into consideration as well.
In particular, one has to understand if the user pursues
primarily a creation strategy based on password manager
support and whether there then exists an observable effect
of this strategy on the password strength and reuse.
In this paper, we present a study that reflects those
considerations (see the bottom of Figure 1). We first re-
cruited 476 participants on Amazon MTurk to conduct
a survey sampling to better understand users’ strategies
for creating and storing passwords, their attitudes towards
passwords, and past experiences with password leaks or
password managers. From those insights, we identified
two distinct groups in our participant pool: users of pass-
word managers and users abstaining from technical help
in password creation. We were further able to recruit 170
of our participants, 49 of which reported using password
managers, for a follow-up study in which our participants
allowed us to monitor their passwords through a Google
Chrome browser plugin that collected password metrics
as well as answers to in situ questionnaires upon password
entry. This gave us detailed information about real-life
passwords, including their strength, their reuse, and, for
the first time, their entry method (e.g., manually typed,
auto-filled, pasted, or entered by a browser plugin) as
well as the passwords’ context, including user reported
value of the password (e.g., loss of social repudiation or
financial harm when the password would be leaked).
Based on the combined data from our survey sampling
and plugin-based data collection, we are able to study the
factors that influence password strength and reuse from a
new perspective. Using exploratory data analysis and sta-
tistical testing, including regression models, we are first
to actually show that password managers indeed influence
password strength and reuse. In particular, the relation be-
tween different entry methods and the password strength
depends on the users’ entire process of password han-
dling. Using a workflow that includes technical support
from password creation through storage to entry leads to
stronger passwords, while this positive effect on password
strength cannot be detected when considering the input
method individually. A similar picture emerges for pass-
word reuse. Passwords entered manually or by Chrome
auto-fill were unique in only 20–25% of all cases. For
LastPass or Copy&Paste password entry, the proportion
of non-reused passwords increases to 53–78%. This is
still far from ideal—that not even a single password is
reused—but still a significant improvement through such
dedicated password management tools. Similar to the
results for password strength, we find that password reuse
improves further if the password generation is technically
supported. In contrast to password strength, however, this
positive effect is similar for all input methods. Looking at
managers that do not offer support for password creation,
such as Chrome’s auto-fill, we even found a negative
influence in that those managers even contribute to the
password reuse problem. In summary, our results support
the fact that technical tools can have a very positive effect
on password security. However, it is important that the
entire password management process is supported—from
generation, over storage, to entry—and not only the old
and weak passwords of the users are stored.
2 Related Work
Textual passwords are for decades [44] the incumbent
authentication scheme for online services [29, 30], and
will very likely remain in that position for the foresee-
able future. They distinguish themselves from alternative
schemes through their very intuitive usage, however, as
well as through a pathological inability of users to create
passwords that withstand guessing attacks [11]. Given the
permanence of passwords, users are commonly referred
to technical help in form of password management soft-
ware [28, 59, 53, 56] to create strong, unique passwords.
In this paper, we aim to better understand how pass-
word managers help users in this task and try to measure
the impact password managers actually have on the cur-
rent status quo. We do this through a comprehensive study
that includes both self-reported user strategies and fac-
tors for password creation and storage as well as in situ
collected password metrics and questionnaire answers.
To put our approach into the larger context and to pro-
vide necessary background information, we give here an
overview of prior research on how users select and (re)use
passwords, how password strength can be measured, and
on dedicated studies of password manager software.
2.1 Password creation
Different works have studied the strategies of users and
the factors that influence the selection of new passwords.
For instance, users create passwords based on something
that has relevance or meaning to them [56], and very often
passwords are based on a dictionary word [38, 52].
The effort the user is willing to invest into creating a
stronger passwords can depend on different factors. For
example, password policies that enforce a certain pass-
word composition (i.e., length and character classes) can
influence the user [70, 26, 38]. Similarly, many websites
use password strength meters to provide real-time feed-
back on new password’s strength and nudge users into
creating stronger passwords [23, 61]. However, often
those policies and meters have inconsistent metrics across
different websites [12, 65, 17], potentially confusing users
about what constitutes a strong password [62]. Also the
value of the password protected account can influence
the user. Prior studies [8, 49, 56, 51] concluded that peo-
ple try to create strong passwords for accounts that they
consider more important, e.g., banking websites. In par-
ticular, users employed password managers for specific
matters [56], such as just using at a work PC but not at
home, or not using them for banking websites. Despite
their apparent benefits, it is unclear how users actually
use password managers and what the exact impact of
password managers is on password reuse and strength.
2.2 Password strength
Password strength has been studied for several years and
different mechanisms have been used to measure a pass-
word’s strength. Shannon entropy [21] provides a way
to estimate the strength based on the passwords compo-
sition. It was formerly used by the NIST guidelines [28]
to estimate the password strength. However, more recent
research [67, 10, 18, 40] argued that guessability metrics
are a more realistic metric than the commonly used en-
tropy metrics, and recommendations, such as NIST [28],
recently picked up the results of this line of research and
have been updated accordingly. One of the vital insights
from this and other research [34] was that passwords are
not chosen randomly but exhibit common patterns and
are derived from a limited set of dictionary words.
Measuring a password’s guessability has been realized
in different ways. Those include Markov models [13, 19],
pattern matching plus word mangling rules [68], or neu-
ral networks [45]. Since prior password strength meters
were based on the password composition and the result-
ing entropy, those new approaches also found their way
into contending password strength meters [68, 45, 60].
However, varying cracking algorithms or techniques can
cause varying password strength results based on configu-
ration, methods, or training data [63]. Also in our study
we measure the password strength based on guessability,
using the openly available zxcvbn [68] tool.
2.3 Password reuse
Prior work [56] has shown that users have an increasing
number of online accounts that require creation of a new
password. To cope with the task of remembering a large
number of passwords, users resort to reusing passwords
across different accounts [16, 37], creating a situation in
which one password leak might affect multiple accounts
at once. A large-scale data collection through an instru-
mented browser [26] was first to highlight this problem.
Since then, newer studies further illustrated the issue of
password reuse. For instance, in a combination of mea-
surement study of real leaked passwords and user sur-
vey [16], 43% of the participants reused passwords and
often a new password was merely a small modification
of an existing one. As with password creation, different
factors can influence the password reuse. For example,
it was shown that the rate of reused passwords increased
with the number of accounts [27], which is troublesome
considering that users accumulate an increasing number
of accounts. As with password strength, also the value
of the website can affect whether a user creates a unique
new password or reuses an existing one [8, 51].
Closest to our methodology are two recent stud-
ies [66, 51] based on data collected with browser plugins
from users. Both studies monitored websites for password
entries and recorded the password characteristics, such as
length and composition, a participant-specific password
hash, the web domain (or domain category), as well as
meta-information including installed browser plugins or
installed software (e.g., anti-virus software). In case of
the newer study [51], also hashes of sub-strings of the
password were collected as well as a strength estimate
using a neural network based password meter [45] and
whether the password was auto-filled or not. Through this
data, both studies had an unprecedented insight into user’s
real password behavior, the factors influencing password
reuse, and could show that password reuse, even partial
reuse of passwords, is a rampant problem. Further relating
to our work, both prior studies also considered the poten-
tial influence of password managers, however, could not
find any significant effect of password managers on pass-
word reuse or strength. However, their studies were not
specifically targeted at investigating the impact of pass-
word managers, and with our methodology we extend
those prior works in two important aspects. First, prior
work only considered the presence of password managers
and whether auto-fill was used. For our work, we de-
rived a more fine-grained detection of the password entry
method, which allows us to distinguish human, plugin-
based, auto-fill, or copy&pasted input to password fields
and thus better detection of managed passwords. Sec-
ond, merely the entry method of a password does not
reveal its origin (e.g., passwords from a password man-
ager might also be copy&pasted or saved in the browser’s
auto-fill). To study the impact of password managers, a
broader view is essential that includes the users’ password
creation strategies in addition to their in situ behavior.
2.4 Security of password managers
Password manager software has also been the subject of
research. Human-subject studies [39, 14] have shown
that they might suffer from usability problems and that
ordinary users might abstain from using them due to trust
issues or not seeing a necessity. Like any other soft-
ware, password managers might also contain vulnerabili-
ties [43, 71] that can compromise user information. Also
the integration of password managers, in particular the
password auto-filling, was scrutinized [55, 57] and flaws
found that can help an adversary to sniff passwords.
3 Methodology
For our study of password managers’ impact on password
strength and reuse, we use data collected from paid work-
ers of Amazon’s crowd-sourcing service Mechanical Turk.
We collected the data in two different stages: 1) a survey
sampling, and 2) collection of in situ password metrics.
Ethical concerns: The protocols implemented in those
two stages were approved by the ethical review board1
of our university. Further, we followed the guidelines
for academic requesters outlined by MTurk workers [20].
All server-side software (i.e., a LimeSurvey installation
and a self-written server application) was self-hosted on a
maintained and hardened university server. Web access to
the server was secured with an SSL certificate issued by
the university’s computing center and all further access
was restricted to the department’s intranet and only made
available to maintainers and collaborating researchers.
Participants could leave the study at any time.
3.1 Password survey
In our survey sampling, we asked participants about their
general privacy attitude, their attitude towards passwords,
their skills and strategies for creating and managing pass-
words, as well as basic demographic questions. Those
information enable us, on the one hand, to gain a gen-
eral overview of common password creation and storage
strategies. On the other hand, those information help us
in detecting and avoiding any potential biases in the later
stages of our study. The full survey contained 31–34 ques-
tions, categorized in 6 different groups (see Appendix A).
We first asked for their privacy attitude using the stan-
dard Westin index [42]. However, since the Westin index
has been shown to be an unreliable measure of the ac-
tual privacy-related actions of users [69], we also asked
about the participants’ attitude towards passwords (e.g.,
whether they consider passwords to be futile in protecting
their privacy).2 This should help in better understanding
if participants are actually motivated to put an effort into
creating stronger and unique passwords. We further asked
about the participants’ strategies for password creation
and management in order to get a more complete picture
of the possible origins of passwords in our dataset.
All qualitative answers (e.g., Q9 or Q22 in Appendix A)
were independently coded in a bottom-up fashion by two
researchers. The researchers achieved an initial agreement
between 95.6% (Q9) and 97.1% (Q22) and all differences
could be resolved in agreement.
Participation in the survey was open to any MTurk
worker that fulfilled the following criteria: the worker was
located in the US and the number of previously approved
tasks was at least 100 or at least 70% all of the tasks.
The estimated time for answering the survey was 10–15
minutes and we paid $4 for participation. In total, 505
MTurk workers participated in our survey between August
1https://erb.cs.uni-saarland.de/
2Other instruments, which meet the latest requirements of scale
constructions and which are often used in recent research, do not reflect
the actual privacy/security attitude construct, but refer more strongly
to security behavior (e.g., SeBIS [22]) or are strongly tailored to the
corporate context (e.g., HAIS-Q [50]).
2017 and October 2017. After discarding responses that
failed attention test questions [33], were answered too
fast to be done thoughtfully, or that were duplicates, we
ended up with 476 valid responses.
Lastly, we also asked whether the participant would be
willing to participate in a follow-up study, in which we
measure in an anonymized, privacy-protecting fashion the
strength and reuse of their passwords. Only participants
that indicated interest in the follow-up study were con-
sidered potential candidates for our Chrome plugin-based
data collection. Only 21 workers were not interested.
3.2 Chrome plugin-based data collection
To collect in situ data about passwords, including strength,
reuse, entry method, and domain, we created a Chrome
browser plugin that monitors the input to password fields
of loaded websites and then sends all collected metrics
back to our server once the user logs in to the website. We
distributed our plugin via the Google Web Store to invited
participants. The plugin was unlisted in the Store, so that
only participants to which we sent the link to the plugin
store website were able to install it. Our primary selec-
tion criterion for participant selection was that they use
Chrome as their primary browser and are not using exclu-
sively mobile devices (smartphones and tablets) to browse
the web; besides that we aimed for an unbiased sampling
from the participants pool with respect to the participants’
privacy attitude, attitude towards passwords, demograph-
ics, and usage of password managers. Between September
and October 2017, we invited 364 participants from the
survey sampling to the study, of which 174 started and
170 finished participation. We asked participants to keep
our plugin installed for at least four days. Participants
that finished the task were compensated with $20.
Our plugin collects the following metrics:
Composition: The length of the entered password as
well as the frequency of each character class.
Strength: The password strength measured in Shan-
non and NIST entropy as well as zxcvbn score. Shannon
and NIST entropy have been used in prior works [24, 66,
23] as a measure of password strength and complexity
and are collected primarily to be backward compatible
in our analysis with prior research. However, since en-
tropy has been shown to be a poor measurement of the
actual "crackability" of the password [67], we use the
zxcvbn [68] score as the more realistic estimator of the
password strength in our analysis.3 Zxcvbn estimates
every password’s strength on a scale from 0 (weakest)
to 4 (strongest) using pattern matching (e.g., repeats,
sequences, keyboard patterns), common password dic-
tionaries (including leaked passwords, names, English
3Unfortunately, the fully trained neural network based strength esti-
mator of [51, 45] was not publicly available.
dictionary words), and mangling rules (e.g., leetify). Ap-
pendix B explains the meaning of this score in more detail.
In our plugin we used the zxcvbn library [3] with its de-
fault settings. From a statistical point of view, a metrically
scaled strength measurement instead of the ordinal zxcvbn
score would have helped in finding possible effects on
password strength easier (see Section 4), however, it does
not affect the presence of possible effects per se.
Website category: The category of the website do-
main according to the Alexa Web Information Service [2].
Our plugin contains the category for the top 28,651 web
domains at the time the study was conducted.4
Entry method: The method through which the pass-
word was entered, such as human, Chrome auto-fill,
copy&paste, 3rd party password manager plugin, or ex-
ternal password manager program. The detection of the
entry method is described separately in Section 3.2.1.
In situ questionnaire: Participant’s answers to a short
questionnaire about the entered password and website (see
Section 3.2.2). In particular, we ask about the website’s
value for their privacy. Other studies used the website
category as a proxy for this value [51] and in our study
we wanted first-hand knowledge (see also Appendix C).
Hashes: Adapting the methodology of [51, 66], we
collect the hash of the entered password as well as the
hash of every 4-character sub-string of the password. We
use a keyed hash (i.e., PBKDF2 with SHA-256), where
the key is generated and stored at the client side and never
revealed to us. This allows identification of (partially)
reused passwords per participant. We use the notions
introduced in [51]: Exactly reused passwords are iden-
tical with another password, partially reused passwords
share a sub-string with another password, and partially-
and-exactly reused passwords have both of those charac-
teristics. Like related work [51, 66], we cannot compare
passwords across participants.
3.2.1 Detecting the entry method
Detection of the password entry method follows the de-
cision tree depicted in Figure 2. If our plugin detects
any kind of typing inside the password field ((A)=Y) and
the typing speed is too fast to come from a human typist
((B)=N), we conclude that an external password manager
program (such as KeePass) mimics a human typist by "re-
playing" the keyboard inputs of the password. Otherwise
((B)=Y), we assume a manually entered password. As
threshold between human and external program, we set
an average key press time of 30 ms. This is based on the
observation that external programs usually do not con-
sider mimicking the key press time, while some of them
enter the password character-wise with varying speeds.
4This is the number of web domains in the top 100K list, for which
a category was assigned by Alexa.
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Figure 2: Decision tree to detect password entry methods
In case there was no typing detected ((A)=N) and a paste
event was observed ((C)=Y), we consider the password
to be pasted by either a human or an external program.
In either case, the password is managed externally to the
browser in digital form. If no paste event was detected
((C)=N) and the Chrome auto-fill event was observed,
this indicates that Chrome filled the password field from
its built-in password manager. If Chrome auto-fill has not
filled the password field ((D)=N), our plugin checks the
list of installed plugins for eight well-known password
manager plugins (see Appendix D) and reports the ones
installed in the participant’s browser, or an "unknown"
value in case none of those eight was found.
We make the assumption that the user does not enter the
password with a mixture of the different entry methods
(e.g., pasting a word and complementing it with typing).
Such mixture of entry methods would result in misclassi-
fication of the detected method. However, we assume that
such behavior is too rare to affect our results significantly.
3.2.2 Participant instructions
We provided our participants with a project website that
gave a step-by-step introduction on how to install our
plugin, set it up, use it, and remove it post-participation.
Google Web Store provided our participants with a very
comfortable way of adding the plugin to their browser. To
set the plugin up, participants had to simply enter their
MTurk worker ID into the plugin. The worker ID was
used as a pseudonym throughout this study to identify
data of the same participant. After setup, the plugin starts
monitoring the users’ password entries. For every newly
detected domain to which a password was submitted, our
plugin asked the participant to answer a short three ques-
tion questionnaire about the participants’ estimate of the
website’s value, the participants’ strength estimate of the
just entered password, and whether the login was success-
ful (see Figure 3). Every participant was instructed to use
the plugin for four days, after which the plugin released
a completion code to be entered into the task on MTurk
Figure 3: In situ questionnaire upon login to a new website.
to finish participation and collect the payment. Through
our server logs and the Google Web Store Developer
Dashboard we confirmed that all participants removed
our plugin shortly after finishing participation. We also
instructed participants to act naturally and not change
their usual behavior during those four days in order to
maximize the ecological validity of our study. The only
exceptions from the usual behavior were the installation
of our plugin and a request to re-login to all websites
where they have an account in order to ensure a sufficient
enough quantity of collected data.
3.2.3 Addressing privacy concerns
A particular consideration of our study design was the
potential privacy concerns of our participants. Since we
essentially ask our participants to install a key-logger
that monitors some of the most privacy-sensitive data,
this might repel participants from participating. Due to
the lack of in-person interviews or consultation between
the researchers and the participants, we tried to address
those concerns through a high level of transparency, sup-
port, and collecting only the minimal amount of data
in a privacy-protecting fashion, which also follows the
guidelines for academic requesters [20].
First, we explained on our project website the moti-
vation behind our study and why acting naturally is im-
portant for our results. In this context, we provided a
complete list of all data that our plugin collects, for which
purpose, and why this data collection does not enable us
to steal the participants’ passwords. We also answered all
participants’ questions in this regard that were sent to us
via email or posted in known MTurk review/discussion fo-
rums. We received feedback from workers that this level
of openness has convinced them to participate in the study.
Second, we distributed our plugin in an authenticated way
via the Google Web Store and did not obfuscate the plu-
gin’s code. Third, we limited the extent of the collected
data to the necessary minimum while still being able to
study password managers’ impact. For instance, we only
collect the first successful login to any website, thus ab-
staining from monitoring participants’ browsing behavior.
Fourth, every participant could inspect the collected data
per domain prior to sending them to us and chose to skip
the data collection for highly sensitive websites.
4 Studying Password Managers’ Impact
In this section, we analyze our collected data, but leave the
discussion of our results for Section 5. After presenting
our participants’ demographics and an overview of their
password reuse and strength, we group our participants
based on their creation strategy and study the impact of
different password management and creation strategies.
4.1 Demographics
Table 1 provides an overview of the demographics of our
participants that answered our survey, that we invited to
the plugin-based study, and that participated in the plugin-
based data collection. We invited participants in equal
parts from every demographic group and every demo-
graphic group participated in almost equal parts in the
plugin-based data collection. We use a Mann-Whitney
rank test [25] to test for significant differences between
the demographic distributions of the 476 participants in
the survey sampling and the 170 participants in the plugin-
based study, and could not find any statistically signifi-
cant (p < .05) differences between those two groups. In
general, our participants’ demographics are closer to the
commonly observed demographics of qualitative studies
in university settings than to the demographics of the
2010 US census [64]. Our participant number is skewed
towards male participants (57.6% identified themselves
as male). Also, our participants covered an age range
from 18 to more than 70 years, where our sample skews
to younger participants (75.2% of our study participants
are younger than 40) as can be commonly observed in be-
havioral research, including password studies and usable
security. The majority of our participants had no computer
science background (80.88%) and was English speaking
(98.3%). Most of the participants identified themselves
as of white/Caucasian ethnicity (74.6%). The participants
also covered a range of educational levels, where a Bach-
elor’s degree was the most common degree (36.6% of all
participants). Further, 80.9% of our participants reported
using Chrome as their primary browser (see Table 2).
Since our study effectively asks participants to install
a password-logger, we were concerned with a potential
opt-in bias towards people that have low privacy concerns
or consider passwords as ineffective security measures.
To this end, we included the three questions of Westin’s
Survey Invited to study Participated
Number of participants 476 364 170
Gender
Female 200 156 (78.0%) 73 (36.5%)
Male 274 208 (75.9%) 97 (35.4%)
Other 1 0 0
No answer 1 0 0
Age group
18–30 180 139 (77.2%) 64 (35.6%)
31–40 178 135 (75.8%) 63 (35.4%)
41–50 71 58 (81.7%) 32 (45.1%)
51–60 35 24 (68.6%) 8 (22.9%)
61–70 11 7 (63.6%) 2 (18.2%)≥71 1 1 (100%) 1 (100%)
Computer science background
Yes 91 64 (70.3%) 27 (29.7%)
No 385 300 (77.9%) 143 (37.1%)
Native language
English 468 358 (76.5%) 167 (35.7%)
Other 8 6 (75.0%) 3 (37.5%)
Education level
Less than high school 3 3 (100%) 1 (33.3%)
High school graduate 68 53 (77.9%) 26 (38.2%)
Some college, no degree 117 85 (72.6%) 34 (29.1%)
Associate’s degree 79 64 (81.0%) 34 (43.0%)
Bachelor degree 174 133 (76.4%) 62 (35.6%)
Ph.D 2 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%)
Graduate/prof. degree 32 25 (78.1%) 12 (37.5%)
Other 1 0 0
Ethnicity
White/Caucasian 355 274 (77.2%) 123 (34.6%)
Black/African American 50 38 (76.0%) 25 (50.0%)
Asian 31 23 (74.2%) 9 (29.0%)
Hispanic/Latino 27 21 (77.8%) 12 (44.4%)
Native American/Alaska 1 0 0
Multiracial 7 5 (71.4%) 1 (14.3%)
Other 5 3 (60.0%) 0
Table 1: Demographics of our participants. Percentages indi-
cate the fraction w.r.t. initial size in the survey sampling.
Browser Chrome Firefox Safari Opera IE/Edge Other
Share 385 71 7 6 1 6
(80.9%) (14.9%) (1.5%) (1.3%) (0.2%) (1.3%)
Table 2: Primary browsers of our 476 survey participants.
Privacy Segmentation Index [42] (Q1 in Appendix A) to
capture our participants’ general privacy attitudes (i.e.,
fundamentalists, pragmatists, unconcerned). We further
added two questions specifically about our participants’
attitude about passwords (see Q4 in Appendix A), e.g., if
passwords are considered a futile protection mechanism
or important for privacy protection. Table 3 summarizes
the results of those questions. Only a minority of 86 of
our survey participants are privacy unconcerned and the
majority of 365 participants believe in the importance of
passwords as a security measure. Almost a third of our
survey participants experienced a password leak in the
past. For our study we sampled in almost equal parts from
those different groups. Using a Mann-Whitney rank test,
we could not find any statistically significant differences
between the survey and study participants’ distribution
of privacy and password attitudes/experiences. Thus, we
argue that the risk of an opt-in bias towards either end of
the spectrum for privacy and password attitude is unlikely.
Survey Invited to study Participated
Privacy concern (Westin index)
Fanatic 217 167 (77.0%) 66 (30.4%)
Unconcerned 86 56 (65.1%) 31 (36.0%)
Pragmatist 173 141 (81.5%) 73 (42.2%)
Attitude about passwords
Pessimist 9 8 (88.9%) 3 (33.3%)
Optimist 365 279 (76.4%) 132 (36.2%)
Conflicted 102 77 (75.5%) 35 (34.3%)
Prior password leak experienced
No 190 151 (79.5%) 72 (37.9%)
Yes 148 111 (75.0%) 58 (39.2%)
Not aware of 138 102 (73.9%) 40 (29.0%)
Table 3: Privacy attitude, attitude about passwords, and prior
experience with password leakage among our participants.
4.2 General password statistics
Tables 4 and 5 provide summary statistics of all pass-
words collected by our plugin. We collected from our 170
participants 1,045 unique passwords and 1,767 password
entries in total. That means, that our average participant
entered passwords to 10.39 distinct domains with a stan-
dard deviation of 5.52 and median of 9. Our participants
reported using on average 29.95 password-secured ac-
counts (Q2 in Appendix A) and we collected on average
61% of each participant’s self-estimated number5 of pass-
words. The lowest number of domains per participant is
1 and the highest is 27, where the 1st quartile is 6 and
the 3rd quartile is 14. Those numbers are hence slightly
lower than those reported in related studies [51]. When
considering only unique passwords, our average partic-
ipant has 6.15 passwords, indicating that passwords are
reused frequently. Our participants entered their pass-
words on average with 2.24 different methods. Looking at
all passwords, our participants reused on average 70.56%
of their passwords, where exact-and-partial reuse is most
common with 36.46% of all passwords. Interestingly the
minimum and maximum in all reuse categories is 0% and
100%, respectively, meaning that we have participants
that did not reuse any of their passwords as well as par-
ticipants that reused all of their passwords. The average
password in our dataset had a length of 9.61 and was
composed of 2.52 character classes. The average zxcvbn
score was 2.20, where the participant with the weakest
passwords had an average of 0.67 and the participant with
the strongest an average of 4.00. Like prior work [66],
we observe a significant correlation between password
strength and reuse (chi-square test: χ2 = 75.48, p < .001).
As shown in Table 5, the majority of the 1,767 logged
passwords was entered with Chrome auto-fill (53.71%)
followed by manual entry (33.39%). Although in our
pilot study various password manager plugins, e.g., Kee-
Pass and 1Password, had been correctly detected, in our
actual study only LastPass was used by our participants.
5Some participants underestimated this number
Statistic Mean Median SD Min Max
No. of passwords 10.39 9.00 5.52 1.00 27.00
Entry methods 2.24 2.00 0.75 1.00 4.00
Percentage reused passwords
Non-reused 29.44% 21.58% 28.25% 0.00% 100%
Only-exact 15.72% 0.00% 24.43% 0.00% 100%
Only-partially 18.38% 11.11% 19.88% 0.00% 100%
Exact-and-partial 36.46% 38.75% 30.88% 0.00% 100%
Password composition
Length 9.61 9.29 1.72 6.33 16.86
Character classes 2.52 2.50 0.58 1.00 3.94
Digits 2.54 2.38 1.24 0.25 6.73
Uppercase letters 0.85 0.67 0.81 0.00 4.62
Lowercase letters 5.92 5.72 1.96 1.67 15.50
Special chars 0.30 0.10 0.54 0.00 5.19
Password strength
Zxcvbn score 2.20 2.14 0.75 0.67 4.00
Shannon entropy 29.31 28.37 7.93 16.00 68.00
NIST entropy 23.50 23.00 2.98 17.17 35.69
Table 4: Summary statistics for all 170 participants in our
plugin-based data collection. We first computed means for
each participant and then computed the mean, median, standard
deviation, and min/max values of those means.
Entry method All passwords Unique passwords
Chrome auto-fill 949 (53.71%) 540 (51.67%)
Human 590 (33.39%) 331 (31.67%)
LastPass plugin 128 (7.24%) 100 (9.57%)
Copy&paste 55 (3.11%) 51 (4.88%)
Unknown plugin 41 (2.32%) 23 (2.20%)
External manager 4 (0.23%) 0 (0.00%)∑ 1,767 1,045
Table 5: No. of password entries with each entry method.
Of all passwords, 128 (7.24%) were entered with Last-
Pass, which is a similar share of managers as in recent re-
ports [46]. Copy&paste and unknown plugins formed the
smallest, relevant-sized shares and only four passwords
were entered programmatically by an external program.
With respect to general password reuse (see Figure 4),
partial-and-exact reuse is by far the most common reuse
across all entry methods, except for LastPass’ plugin and
Copy&paste, which have a noticeably high fraction of
non-reused passwords (e.g., 68 or 53% of all passwords
entered with LastPass were not reused) and have notice-
ably less password reuse than the overall average. Look-
ing at the password strength for all unique passwords (see
Figure 5), one can see that 65% or 44 of all passwords
entered with LastPass are stronger than the overall aver-
age of 2.20, while the other entry methods show a more
balanced distribution across the zxcvbn scores (except
for score 0). In summary, this indicates that LastPass
shows an improved password strength (mean of 2.80 with
SD=1.07) and password uniqueness in comparison to the
other entry methods. Copy&paste exhibits the strongest
password uniqueness, however, at the same time the weak-
est password strength (1.98 on average with a SD=1.33).
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Figure 4: Password reuse by entry method for all passwords.
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Figure 5: Zxcvbn score per entry method for unique passwords.
4.3 Grouping based on creation strategy
We grouped our participants based on their self-reported
strategies for creating new passwords (see Q9, Q13, and
Q15 in Appendix A). Based on their answers, we discov-
ered a dichotomous grouping:
Group 1: Password managers/generators ("PWM"):
First, we identified participants that reported using a pass-
word generator, either as integrated part of a password
manager program (e.g., "I use lastpass.com, which au-
tomatically creates and saves very strong passwords.")
or as an extra service ("I use a service to generate/cre-
ate passwords that I put the parameters in that I would
like."). Many also implied the usage of a manager for
password storage (e.g., "I use a password creation and
storage-related browser extension that also is related to
an installed password manager application on my per-
sonal computer."), however, some participants explicitly
noted a separate storage solution ("I use an app that cre-
ates random character strings to pick new passwords for
me. I then memorize it so I don’t have to keep it written
down" or "I will use a random password generator. [...] I
will save the new password in a secure location such as a
password protected flash drive."). In total, 45 (or 26.47%)
out of 170 participants fell into this category.
Group 2: Human-generated ("Human"): We dis-
covered that all 121 remaining participants described a
strategy that abstains from using technical means. Al-
most all of the participants in this group reported that they
"try to come up with a (random) combination of numbers,
letters, and characters." For instance, one participant
symptomatically reported: "I think of a word I want to use
and will remember like. mouse. I then decide to capitalize
a letter in it like mOuse. I then add a special character
to the word like mOuse@. I then decided a few numbers
to add like mOuse@84." Only a very small subgroup of
seven participants reported using analog tools to create
passwords, such as dice or books ("I have a book on my
desk I pick a random page number and I use the first letter
of the first ten words and put the page number at the end
and a period after."), or using passphrases.
Many of the participants in this group also hinted in
their answers to their password storage strategies. For
instance, various participants emphasized ease of remem-
bering as a criteria for new passwords (e.g., "something
easy to remember, replace some letters with numbers."),
others use analog or digital storage (e.g., "I try to remem-
ber something easy or I right[sic] it down on my computer
and copy&paste it when needed."). Many participants
also admitted re-using passwords as their strategy (e.g., "I
use the same password I always use because it has served
me well all these years" and "I have several go to words i
use and add numbers and symbols that i can remember").
4.3.1 Group demographics
We provide an overview of the groups’ demographics in
Appendix E. We again used a Mann-Whitney test to detect
any significant differences in the distributions of those two
demographic groups. We find that they have statistically
significant different distribution for gender (U = 2,366,
p = .016), computer science background (U = 2,181,
p < .001), and attitude towards passwords (U = 3,440,
p = .024). More participants in GroupPWM identified
themselves as male in comparison to GroupHuman. The
fractions of participants that have a computer science
background and that are optimistic about passwords are
higher in the group of password manager users. Gender
and computer science background are significantly corre-
lated for our participants (Fisher’s exact test: OR = 3.99,
p = .005) as are computer science background and pass-
word attitude (chi-square test: χ2 = 9.24, p < .01). One
hypothesis for this distribution could be that computer sci-
ence studies had historically more male students and that
their technical background may have induced awareness
of the importance of passwords as a security measure and
the promised benefits of password managers.
4.3.2 Comparison of password strength and reuse
Figures 6 and 7 provide a comparison of the password
strength and reuse between the two groups. The hatched
bars indicate the overall number of passwords per zxcvbn
score and reuse category. The plain bars break the num-
ber of passwords down by entry method. Participants
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Figure 6: Password strength distribution by participant group
and broken down by entry method. Hatched bars show total
number of passwords per score. (Note the different y-axis limits)
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Figure 7: Distribution of reuse categories by participant group,
broken down by entry method. Hatched bars show total number
of passwords per category. (Note the different y-axis limits)
in GroupPWM entered in total 522 passwords and partic-
ipants in GroupHuman entered in total 1245 passwords
(both numbers include reused passwords, see Table 6).
For password strength (see Figure 6), neither group
contained a noticeable fraction of the weakest passwords
(score 0). However, GroupHuman shows a clear tendency
towards weaker passwords. For instance, there are almost
twice as many score 1 passwords (n = 390) than score 4
passwords (n = 191). In contrast, the most frequent score
for GroupPWM is 2 (n = 158), but the distribution shows a
lower kurtosis (e.g., scores 1, 3, and 4 have the frequen-
cies 126, 113, and 114). When breaking the number of
passwords down by their entry method, Chrome auto-fill
is the dominating entry method for all zxcvbn scores 1–4
in both groups except for score 1 in GroupPWM where
manually entered passwords are most frequent. However,
Entry method Group 1 (PWM) Group 2 (Human)
All passwords
Chrome auto-fill 242 (46.36%) 707 (56.79%)
Human 160 (30.65%) 430 (34.54%)
LastPass plugin 93 (17.82%) 35 (2.81%)
Copy&paste 16 (3.07%) 39 (3.13%)
Unknown plugin 8 (1.53%) 33 (2.65%)
External manager 3 (0.57%) 1 (0.08%)∑ 522 1245
Unique passwords
Chrome auto-fill 144 (42.99%) 396 (55.77%)
Human 101 (30.15%) 230 (32.39%)
LastPass plugin 72 (21.49%) 28 (3.94%)
Copy&paste 14 (4.18%) 37 (5.21%)
Unknown plugin 4 (1.19%) 19 (2.68%)∑ 335 710
Table 6: Distribution of entry methods per participant group.
for GroupPWM the fraction of passwords entered with
LastPass’ plugin (n = 93 or 17.82% of the passwords)
is considerably larger than for GroupHuman (n = 35 or
2.81%). In particular, for GroupPWM, passwords entered
with LastPass have mostly scores higher than 2 (n = 82),
where score 4 is the most frequent (n = 32).
Regarding password reuse (see Figure 7), the most
frequent category is exactly-and-partially reused (n =
189 or 36.21% for GroupPWM; n = 555 or 44.58% for
GroupHuman). However, GroupPWM shows a bimodal dis-
tribution in which not-reused passwords are almost as
frequent (n = 187) as exactly-and-partially reused ones.
Further, Chrome auto-fill is the dominating entry method
across all reuse categories in both groups. However, when
breaking the passwords down by entry method, more
than half (n = 49 or 52.69%) of the passwords entered
with LastPass in GroupPWM have not been reused in
any way. The vast majority of reused passwords can
be attributed to manual entry and Chrome auto-fill. In
GroupPWM, 335 (64.18%) of the passwords have been
reused and 979 (78.63%) of the passwords in GroupHuman.
Of the 335 reused passwords in GroupPWM, 278 (82.99%)
have been entered manually or with Chrome auto-fill. In
GroupHuman, 926 (74.38%) of the reused passwords were
entered manually or with auto-fill.
4.4 Modeling password strength and reuse
In the next step of our analysis we looked at factors influ-
encing the password strength or password reuse among
our participants. Our analyses showed that our partici-
pants significantly differ from each other in their aver-
age password strength (Kruskal-Wallis one-way analy-
sis of variance, χ2 = 779.19,d f = 169, p < .001) as well
as in their average probability of password reuse (χ2 =
692.70,d f = 169, p < .001). The underlying reasons for
these differences may be factors that we were able to mea-
sure, like the password entry methods of the users, as well
as latent characteristics of the users, like their personality
or their security awareness. The goal of our further analy-
ses was to show that the effect of the password managers
can be shown even beyond these individual differences in
password behavior among participants.
One possible way to analyze such a question is a multi-
level (aka hierarchical) analysis. This type of regression
analysis takes into account the hierarchical structure of
our data, where individual password entries are grouped
under the corresponding user. Latent, individual differ-
ences between users are taken into account in the form of
different intercept and/or slope for each user. To get a bet-
ter understanding of the influencing factors for password
strength and reuse, we tested step-wise several regression
models. The multi-level models with the studied factors
(e.g. entry method) showed a significantly better fit to our
data than models that take into account the individual dif-
ferences between users but do not include the influencing
factors we studied. A better fit of the multi-level models
was also found in comparison to models that contained
the influencing factors but not the individual differences.
In the following, we describe our approach to verify the
prerequisites for multi-level analysis and our approach to
construct the models. Afterwards we report the models
for password strength and reuse that fit best to our data.
4.4.1 Correlation analysis
Before constructing the models, we started out with a
correlation analysis of the available factors (e.g., pass-
word composition, participant group, self-reported web-
site value, etc.). As multi-level models are highly vul-
nerable to multi-collinearity, detecting and potentially
removing strongly correlated variables is essential to pre-
vent inaccurate model estimations, which could lead to
false positive results. In our dataset, we detected a very
high, significant correlation between zxcvbn scores and
password composition, in particular password length, as
well as with the NIST and Shannon entropies. Since we
consider zxcvbn a more realistic measurement of crack-
ability, we omitted NIST and Shannon entropies from
our model. Investigation of zxcvbn showed that zxcvbn
rewards lengthy passwords with better scores and that its
pattern and l33t speak detection can penalize passwords
with digits and special characters. Since zxcvbn is the
more interesting factor for us and since it partially con-
tains the effect of the password composition on the predic-
tion, we excluded password composition parameters from
our models. Moreover, we noticed that password reuse
was strongly correlated with the presence of a lowercase
character in the password. A closer inspection of our
dataset showed, that our data contained a number of PINs,
which were all unique, and that every non-PIN password
contains at least one lowercase character. In this situation,
including the presence/absence of lowercase characters
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
em:chrome 0.07 0.12 0.59 0.56
em:copy/paste -0.13 0.35 -0.89 0.37
em:lastpass 0.24 0.35 0.69 0.49
em:unknownplugin 1.02 0.34 2.97 <0.01
in-situ:value 0.02 0.05 0.48 0.63
in-situ:strength 0.89 0.07 12.68 <0.001
user:entries 0.02 0.02 0.69 0.49
q9:generator -0.45 0.67 -0.68 0.50
q14:memorize -0.24 0.30 -0.79 0.43
q14:analog 0.05 0.29 0.16 0.88
q14:digital 0.09 0.31 0.29 0.77
q14:pwm -0.16 0.28 -0.57 0.57
em:chrome * q9:gen. 2.30 0.60 3.84 <0.001
em:copy/paste * q9:gen. 3.40 1.22 2.79 <0.01
em:lastpass * q9:gen. 1.83 0.82 2.24 <0.05
em:unknownplugin * q9:gen. 0.22 1.34 0.16 0.87
em: Entry method; q9: Creation strategy; q14: Storage strategy; in-situ: Plugin questionnaire
Table 7: Logistic multi-level regression model predicting zx-
cvbn score. Estimates are in relation to manually entered pass-
words by a human. Statistically significant predictors are shaded.
Interactions are marked with *.
would result in our model just distinguishing between
PINs and non-PINs when predicting password reuse.
4.4.2 Constructing the models
For both password reuse and strength prediction, we
started with a base model without any explanatory vari-
ables, which we iteratively extended with additional pre-
dictors. In three steps we included a) entry methods,
self-reported value, and strength; b) the number of indi-
vidually submitted passwords per participant, the creation
and storage strategy of the user; in a final step c) the
interaction between creation strategy and detected entry
method. This approach not only allows us to evaluate the
effects of the individual explanatory variables, but also to
investigate the interplay between different storage strate-
gies and the password creation strategy. In each iteration
we computed the model fit and used log likelihood model
fit comparison to check whether the new, more complex
model fit the data significantly better than the previous one
(see Appendix F). As our final model we picked the one
with the best fit that was significantly better in explaining
the empirical data than the previous models. This is a well
established procedure for model building, e.g., in social
sciences and psychological research [32, 25, 9, 15], and
allows the creation of models that have the best trade-off
of complexity, stability, and fitness.
4.4.3 Zxcvbn score
For the zxcvbn score an ordinal model with all predictors
and also the mentioned interaction described our data best.
The model is presented in Table 7.
The interactions between the self-reported creation
strategy (q9:generator; see Q9 in Appendix A) and the de-
tected entry methods Chrome auto-fill, copy&paste, and
LastPass were significant predictors in our model. Those
entry methods and also the creation strategy are not signif-
icant predictors of password strength on their own. This
means that using such a password management tool only
leads to significant improvement in the password strength
when users also employ some supporting techniques (pass-
word generator) for the creation of their passwords. The
model might suggest that a general password entry with
a plugin (other than LastPass in our dataset) increased
the likelihood of a strong password. However, this could
be attributed to the high standard error resulting from the
minimal data for this entry method.
Moreover, the self-reported password strength was a
significant predictor of the measured password strength.
This suggests that the users have a very clear view on the
strength of the passwords they have entered.
4.4.4 Password reuse
For password reuse a logistical model with all predictors
but without interactions described our data best. Table 8
presents our regression model to predict password reuse.
Reuse was significantly influenced by the entry method
of the password. In contrast to human entry the odds
for reuse were 2.85 time lower if the password was en-
tered with LastPass (odds ratio 0.35, predicted probability
of reuse with Lastpass = 48.35%) and even 14.29 times
lower if entered via copy&paste (odds ratio 0.07, pre-
dicted probability of reuse with copy&paste = 19.81%).
Interestingly, the input via Google Chrome auto-fill even
had a negative effect on the uniqueness of the passwords.
In contrast to human entry the odds for reuse were 1.65
times higher if the password was entered with Chrome
auto-fill (odds ratio 1.58, predicted probability of reuse
with Chrome auto-fill = 83.72%). A further significant
predictor of password reuse is the user’s approach to cre-
ating passwords. For users who use technical tools to
create their passwords (q9:generator), the chances that
the passwords are not reused are 3.70 times higher (odds
ratio 0.27, predicted probability of reuse if technical tools
are used = 47.36%). In contrast to the models explaining
the zxcvbn-score, our data does not indicate the presence
of an interaction effect of the password creation strategy
on the relation between entry method and password reuse.
In addition, we found a positive relation between the
numbers of passwords entered by users and their reuse. In
our model, each additional password of the user increases
the chance that it will be reused by 6% (odds ratio 1.06).
This suggests that with increasing numbers of passwords,
it becomes more likely that some of them will be reused,
which is in line with prior results [27].
We also found the self-reported website value and
password strength a statistically significant predictor for
Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 2.62 0.45 5.80 <0.001
em:chrome 0.46 0.16 2.81 <0.01
em:copy/paste -2.68 0.41 -6.54 <0.001
em:lastpass -1.05 0.37 -2.86 <0.01
em:unknownplugin 0.76 0.51 1.51 0.13
in-situ:value -0.13 0.06 -2.01 <0.05
in-situ:strength -0.21 0.08 -2.50 <0.05
user:entries 0.06 0.02 2.67 <0.01
q9:generator -1.31 0.40 -3.24 <0.01
q14:memorize 0.22 0.25 0.88 0.38
q14:analog -0.48 0.24 -1.98 <0.05
q14:digital -0.18 0.26 -0.70 0.48
q14:pwm -0.07 0.24 -0.30 0.76
em: Entry method; q9: Creation strategy; q14: Storage strategy; in-situ: Plugin questionnaire
Table 8: Logistic multi-level regression model predicting reuse.
Estimates are in relation to manually entered passwords by a
human and refer to the corresponding logit transformed odds
ratios. Statistically significant predictors are shaded.
reuse [8]. Passwords entered to a website with a higher
value for the user were less likely to be reused (odds ra-
tio of 0.87) and also passwords that the users considered
stronger were less likely to be reused (odds ratio of 0.81).
Lastly, users that reported using an analog password
storage (q14:analog; see Q14 in Appendix A) were less
likely to reuse their passwords (odds ratio of 0.62).
5 Discussion
5.1 Password Managers’ Impact
In general, our participants showed very similar password
strength and reuse characteristics as in prior studies [51,
66] and our analysis could also reaffirm prior results, such
as rampant password reuse.
Our study adds novel insights to the existing literature
by considering the exact password entry methods and by
painting a more complete picture by considering the users’
password creation strategies. We found that almost all
participants entered passwords with more than one entry
method. Further, we discovered that every entry method
showed reused passwords, although the ratio of reused
passwords differs significantly between the entry methods.
More than 80% of Chrome auto-filled passwords were
reused, while only 47% of the passwords entered with
LastPass’ plugins were reused in some way, and even
only 22% of the copied/pasted passwords. Similarly, we
noticed that low-strength passwords have been entered
with all entry methods, where LastPass had on average
the strongest passwords (mean zxcvbn score of 2.80).
Interestingly, manually entered passwords and Chrome
auto-filled passwords were on a par with the overall pass-
word strength but showed above average reuse rates.
For our participants, we discovered a dichotomous dis-
tribution of self-reported creation strategies. Participants
indicated using a password generator right now or in the
recent past, or clearly described mental algorithms and
similar methods for human-generated passwords. Taking
a differentiated view based on the creation strategies, we
find that users of a password generator are closer to a
desirable situation with stronger, less reused passwords,
although being far from ideal. Only a negligible frac-
tion of participants mentioned analog tools or alternative
strategies (like two-factor authentication). Two-factor au-
thentication (2FA), in particular, might be a valuable fea-
ture for future, targeted investigations, but for our study,
we excluded 2FA since most (major) websites still lack
support for 2FA and even for services offering 2FA sup-
port the userbase has only little adapted to it [46].
Using regression modeling, we put our data together
to a more complete view of password managers’ influ-
ence. Our models suggest that the interaction between
the creation strategy and the entry methods has a signifi-
cant influence on the password strength. If the passwords
are entered with technical support (auto-fill, password
manager plugin, or copy&paste), this results in stronger
passwords under the condition that technical means were
already used when generating the passwords in the first
place. Thus, password managers that provide users with
password creation features indeed positively influence
the overall password strength in the ecosystem. All the
more, it is curious that Chrome, as the primary tool to
access websites, has the password generation feature dis-
abled by default [7]. Future work could investigate and
compare Apple’s walled-garden ecosystem, where the Sa-
fari browser has this feature enabled by default. Another,
maybe surprising, result of our modeling is that the self-
reported password strength was a significant predictor for
the measured password strength, suggesting that our par-
ticipants have a clear view on the strength of the entered
password. This is in contradiction to prior results of lab
studies, like [62], and we think it is worth investigating
why users in the wild are so much better at judging their
own password strength.
Our models further suggest, that the use of password
generators and the website value also significantly re-
duced the chance of password reuse. More interestingly,
however, is that the password storage strategies have dif-
ferent influence independently of an interaction with the
creation strategy. Using a password manager plugin or
copy&pasting passwords reduced password reuse, while
Chrome’s auto-fill aggravated reuse. In other words, we
observed that users were able to manually create more
unique passwords when managing their passwords digi-
tally or with a manager, but not with Chrome auto-fill.
The benefit of password managers is also put into bet-
ter perspective when considering particular strategies in
our GroupHuman. We noticed that users tend to have a
"self-centered" view when it comes to password unique-
ness (i.e., personal vs. global), but are unaware of the fact
that an attacker would not be concerned with personal
uniqueness of passwords. A large fraction of users re-
ported to "come up with [a password they] have never
used before" or to "try to think of something that [they]
have never used before." Those results also align with
prior studies [56, 52, 38]. While our participants were
able to correctly judge the strength of their entered pass-
words, their creation strategies indicate an incomplete un-
derstanding of uniqueness. In the future, the influence of
services like Have I Been Pwned6, which are increasingly
integrated into password creation forms and managers,
onto the users’ understanding of uniqueness and password
reuse could be studied.
Another interesting question that comes from our study
is why users of password managers (GroupPWM) still
reuse passwords and employ weak passwords. There
could be different reasons, on which we can only spec-
ulate at this point. For instance, users might employ a
default password for low-value websites, however, we
could not find any evidence in our data set for a corre-
lation between website value and strength or reuse for
GroupPWM. Another explanation could be that those pass-
words existed prior to starting using a password manager
and were never replaced (e.g., LastPass introduced fea-
tures7 for automatically updating "legacy passwords" in
2014), or maybe those are passwords that are also required
on devices not managed by the user (e.g., computer pool
devices at the university). Thus, we think it would inter-
esting to investigate this question more focused.
Further, in light of the high relevance of copy&paste
for strong and unique passwords, our results can also
underline the "Cobra effect" [35, 36, 47] of disabling
paste functionality for password fields on websites to en-
courage the use of 2FA or password managers. Based
on our data, we consider those users who mainly use
copy&paste to enter their passwords to be a very interest-
ing subgroup that would be worth further research (e.g.,
which storage strategies are exactly pursued or motivation
to abstain from managers). Unfortunately, there were too
few copy&paste users in our current dataset to make any
further reliable statements about them separately.
In summary, password managers indeed provide bene-
fits to the users’ password strength and uniqueness. Al-
though both benefits can be achieved separately, our data
suggest that the integrated workflow of 3rd party pass-
word managers for generation and storage provides the
highest benefits. More troublesome is that our results
suggest that the most widely used manager, Chrome’s
auto-filling feature, has only a positive effect on password
strength when used in conjunction with an additional gen-
erator and even shows an aggravating effect on password
6https://haveibeenpwned.com
7https://blog.lastpass.com/2014/12/introducing-
auto-password-changing-with.html/
reuse. The conclusion we draw from this, is that research
should investigate how such integrated workflows can
be brought to more users, e.g., by better understanding
and tackling the reasons why users abstain from using
password managers in the first place.
5.2 Threats to validity
As with other human-subject and field studies, we can-
not eliminate all threats to the validity of our study. We
targeted Google Chrome users, which had in general [6]
the highest market share, also among our survey partici-
pants. Further, we recruited only experienced US workers
on Amazon MTurk, which might not be representative
for any population or other cultures (external validity),
however, our demographics and password statistics show
alignment with prior studies. Furthermore, we collected
our data in the wild, which yields a high ecological valid-
ity and avoids common problems of password lab stud-
ies [41], but on the downside does not give control over
all variables (internal validity). We asked our participants
to behave naturally and also tried to encourage this behav-
ior through transparency, availability, and above average
payment, however, like closest related work [66, 51] we
cannot exclude that some participants behaved unusually.
6 Conclusion
Passwords are the de-facto authentication scheme on the
internet. Since users are very often referred to password
managers as a technical solution for creating guessing-
resistant, unique passwords, it is important to understand
the impact that those managers actually have on users’
passwords. Studying this impact requires in the first place
an approach that is able to detect potential effects of man-
agers. This paper’s first contribution is an addition to
the existing methodology, which for the first time al-
lowed measuring the influence of managers on password
strength and reuse in the wild. By combining insights into
users’ password storage and creation strategies within situ
collected password metrics, we create a more complete
view of passwords. We applied this methodology in a
study with 170 workers from Amazon MTurk and were
able to show that password managers indeed influence
password security. More importantly, we were further
able to study factors that affect the password strength and
reuse. We found that users that rely on technical support
for password creation had both stronger and more unique
passwords, even if entered through other channels than
a manager. We also found that Chrome’s auto-fill option
aggravated the password reuse problem. For future work,
we see different alleys. For instance, investigating how
different, even novel forms of password generators can
be integrated with users’ strategies. Moreover, one could
apply our approach to explore password managers’ influ-
ence in other ecosystems, such as Apple’s walled-garden
ecosystem or mobile password managers.
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A Sampling Survey Questions
Q1: For each of the following statements, how strongly do you
agree or disagree?
a1: Consumer have lost all control over how personal
information is collected and used by companies.
a2: Most businesses handle the personal information they
collect about consumers in a proper and confidential way.
a3: Existing laws and organizational practices provide a
reasonable level of protection for consumer privacy today.
(i) Strongly disagree, (ii) Somewhat disagree, (iii) Somewhat
agree, (iv) Strongly agree
Q2: On how many different Internet sites do you have a user
account that is secured with a password? (If you are not sure
about the number please estimate the number) (FreeText)
Q3: Has ever one of your passwords been leaked or been
stolen?
(i) Yes, (ii) No, (iii) I am not aware of that, (iv) I do not care
Q4: How strongly do you agree or disagree:?
b1. Passwords are useless, because hackers can steal my data
either way. (i) Strongly disagree, (ii) Somewhat disagree,
(iii) Somewhat agree, (iv) Strongly agree
b2. I don’t care about my passwords’ strength, because I don’t
have anything to hide. (i) Strongly disagree, (ii) Somewhat
disagree, (iii) Somewhat agree, (iv) Strongly agree
Q5: What characterizes in your opinion a strong/secure
password? (FreeText)
Q6: Please rate the strength of the following passwords?
c1. thHisiSaSecUrePassWord
c2. Pa$sWordsk123
c3. AiWuutaiveep9j
c4. !@#$%&ˆ*()
c5. 12/07/2017
(i) Very weak, (ii) Weak, (iii) Moderate strength, (iv) Strong,
(v) Very strong
Q7: I have never used a computer? (i) I have never, (ii) I do
Q8: How would you rate your ability to create strong
passwords?
(i) 5 (high ability), (ii) 4, (iii) 3, (iv) 2, (v) 1 (low ability)
Q9: How do you proceed if you have to create a new password?
(What is your strategy?) (FreeText)
Q10: I try to create secure passwords.....
(i) for all my accounts and websites, (ii) for my email accounts,
(iii) for online shopping, (iv) for online booking/reservation,
(v) for social networks, (vi) No answer, (vii) Other
Q11: I make a point of changing my passwords on websites that
are critical to my privacy every...... (choose the closest match)
(i) Day, (ii) Week, (iii) Two weeks, (iv) Month, (v) 6 month,
(vi) Year, (vii) Never, (viii) Other
Q12: Do you use the same password for different email
accounts, websites, or devices? (i) Yes, (ii) No
Q13: Do you use any of the following strategies for creating
your password or part of your password, anywhere, at any
time in the last year... (i) I used the name of celebrities as a
password or as a part of a password, (ii) I used the name of
family members as a password or as a part of a password, (iii) I
used literature (book, poetry, etc.) as a password or as a part
of a password, (iv) I used familiar numbers (street address,
employee number, etc) as a password or as a part of a password,
(v) I used random characters as a password, (vi) I used a
password manager to generate passwords, (vii) No answer,
(viii) Other
Q14: How do you remember all of your passwords? (i) I write
them down on paper (notebook, day planner, etc), (ii) I try to
remember them (human memory), (iii) I use computer files
(Word document, Excel sheet, text file, etc), (iv) I use encrypted
computer files (e.g. CryptoPad), (v) I store my passwords on my
mobile phone or PDA, (vi) I use 3rd party password manager
(save in extra program, e.g. LastPass, keepass, 1Password, etc.),
(vii) I use website cookies (Website checkbox: "Remember my
password on this computer"), (viii) I use the same password for
more than one purpose, (ix) I use browser built-in password
manager (i.e saved in browser), (x) I use a variation of a
past password (eg. password1 and then password2 and then
password3, etc.), (xi) No answer, (xii) Other
Q15: Have you ever used a computer program to generate your
passwords? (i) Yes, (ii) No
Q16: When creating a new password, which do you regard as
most important: choosing a password that is easy to remember
for future use (ease of remembering) or the password’s
security?
(i) Always ease of remembering, (ii) Mostly ease of remember-
ing, (iii) Mostly security, (iv) Always security, (v) Other
Q17: When you create a new password, which of the following
factors do you consider? The password ....
(i) does not contain dictionary words, (ii) is in a foreign
(non-English) language, (iii) is not related to the site (i.e., the
name of the site), (iv) includes numbers, (v) includes special
characters (e.g. "&" or "!"), (vi) is at least eight (8) characters
long, (vii) None of the above: I didn’t think about it, (viii) No
answer, (ix) Other
Q18: My home planet is Earth? (i) Yes, (ii) No
Q19: Do you use the "save password" feature of your browser?
(i) Yes, (ii) No
Q20: Do you use any kind of extra password manager program
(for instance, LastPass, 1Password, Keepass, Dashlane, etc.)?
(i) Yes, (ii) No
Q21: Which password manager(s) do you use? (You can write
one name per line) (FreeText)
Q22: Please give us a short description of your impression of
using your browser’s password saving feature and/or of using
extra password managers (FreeText)
Q23: How many passwords do you keep in your password
manager(s) and browser’s saved passwords? (if you don’t know
the exact number, please estimate the number) (FreeText)
B Zxcvbn Score
To better understand zxcvbn’s scoring, we used zxcvbn
to score 200 million unique passwords collected from
hashes.org, where we measured the zxcvbn score and
the corresponding guesses in log10. The results in Ta-
ble 9 show that each score has a corresponding cutoff for
guesses, e.g., score 2 requires between 103–106 guesses.
Score #Passwords Mean SD Min 25% 50% 75% Max
0 122,296 2.69 0.42 0.30 2.48 2.92 3.00 3.00
1 34,496,960 5.34 0.59 3.00 5.00 5.44 5.87 6.00
2 69,090,776 7.15 0.66 6.00 6.61 7.00 7.87 8.00
3 57,256,840 8.87 0.65 8.00 8.28 8.87 9.36 10.00
4 39,789,207 12.51 2.29 10.00 11.00 12.00 13.36 32.00
Table 9: Zxcvbn scores and estimated no. of guesses (in log10)
for 200 million unique passwords from hashes.org.
C Website category vs. website value
Commonly the website category is used as a proxy for the
website value. Since we collected both, we can provide
insights into this general assumption. Figure 8 shows the
self-reported value per domain. For instance, in >70% of
logged passwords for a financial domain, the user reported
a very high value for that domain. Similarly, in >60% of a
logged passwords for news websites, the users (strongly)
disagreed that this domain has a high value.
D Known Password Manager Plugins
Chrome plugins are identified through a 32 characters
long UUID that can be retrieved from Google’s Chrome
Web Store. Table 10 lists the password manager plugins
that our study plugin can detect based on their UUID.
Plugins not in this list are reported as "Unknown plugin."
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Figure 8: Self-reported website value per website category
Name UUID
Dashlane fdjamakpfbbddfjaooikfcpapjohcfmg
LastPass hdokiejnpimakedhajhdlcegeplioahd
1Password aomjjhallfgjeglblehebfpbcfeobpgk
Roboform pnlccmojcmeohlpggmfnbbiapkmbliob
Enpass kmcfomidfpdkfieipokbalgegidffkal
Zoho Vault igkpcodhieompeloncfnbekccinhapdb
Norton Identity Safe iikflkcanblccfahdhdonehdalibjnif
KeePass ompiailgknfdndiefoaoiligalphfdae
Table 10: UUIDs of plugins detected by our study plugin
E Demographics of participant groups
Table 11 presents the demographics of our two participant
groups according their password creation strategies.
F Model fit
All models in the building process were compared ac-
cording to the corresponding akaike information criterion
(AIC), which is an estimator of the relative quality of
statistical models for a given set of data. Additionally, the
models were statistically compared using likelihood-ratio
tests, which were evaluated using a Chi-squared distribu-
tion. The final model is selected based on AIC as well as
their ability to describe the empirical data better than the
previous models. Tables 12 and 13 present the goodness
of fit for the relevant steps in the model building process.
Human PWM
Number of participants
121 49
Gender
Female 59 (48.76%) 14 (28.57%)
Male 62 (51.24%) 35 (71.43%)
Age group
18–30 48 (39.67%) 16 (32.65%)
31–40 39 (32.23%) 24 (48.98%)
41–50 27 (22.31%) 5 (10.20%)
51–60 5 (4.13%) 3 (6.12%)
61–70 2 (1.65%) 0≥71 0 0 1 (2.04%)
Computer science background
Yes 10 (8.26%) 17 (34.69%)
No 111 (91.74%) 32 (65.13%)
Education level
Less than high school 0 1 (2.04%)
High school graduate 22 (18.18%) 4 (8.16%)
Some college, no degree 28 (23.14%) 6 (12.24%)
Associate’s degree 27 (22.31%) 7 (14.29%)
Bachelor degree 35 (28.93%) 27 (55.10%)
Ph.D 0 1 (2.04%)
Graduate/prof. degree 9 (7.44%) 3 (6.12%)
Ethnicity
White/Caucasian 91 (75.21%) 32 (65.31%)
Black/African American 15 (12.40%) 10 (20.41%)
Asian 5 (4.13%) 4 (8.16%)
Hispanic/Latino 10 (8.26%) 2 (4.08%)
Multiracial 0 1 (2.04%)
Privacy concern (Westin index)
Privacy fanatic 45 (37.19%) 21 (42.86%)
Privacy unconcerned 15 (12.40%) 16 (32.65%)
Privacy pragmatist 61 (50.41%) 12 (24.49%)
Attitude about passwords
Pessimist 1 (0.83%) 2 (4.08%)
Optimist 88 (72.73%) 44 (89.80%)
Conflicted 32 (26.45%) 3 (6.12%)
Prior password leaked experienced
No 53 (43.80%) 19 (38.78%)
Yes 44 (36.36%) 14 (28.57%)
Not aware of 24 (19.83%) 16 (32.65%)
Table 11: Demographics of our two participant categories.
AIC logLik df Pr(>Chisq)
simple regression 5080.6 -2536.3
multi-level base 4536.7 -2263.4 1 <0.001
+ login level 4316.3 -2147.1 6 <0.001
+ user level 4320.4 -2143.2 6 0.2494034
+ interactions 4309.5 -2133.7 4 <0.001
Table 12: Goodness of fit for models predicting ZCVBN scores
AIC logLik Df Pr(>Chisq)
simple regression 1959.7 -978.84
multi-level base 1794.6 -895.28 1 < 0.001
+ login level 1694.9 -839.46 6 < 0.001
+ user level 1684.7 -828.37 6 <0.01
+ interactions 1687.6 -825.80 4 0.27351
Table 13: Goodness of fit for models predicting password reuse
